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INTRODUCTION 
The early man had to defend himself when attacked, but o t h e m i w  concerned 
. himself with securing food and shelter. Today things are more complex for the 
individual as well as society. There are hundreds, indeed thousands, of tasks 
and needs to be addressed or attended to. Available resources are limited. 
Economic analysis constitutes a means of allocating scarce resources - whcthcr 
they be capital, labor, management, R&D and/or equipment to competing nceds. 
studies the behavior of individuals and markets, whereas issues related to a nation 
woula oe classified under macroeconomics. The study of Government expenditures 
is generally referred to as welfare economics. (This is not to be confused with the 
administration of a welfare program within a given level of Government.) 
Understandably there is a host of competing ends for the Government dollar, 
and Government revenues or sources of income are alas limited. €!ence some 
kind of "rationing" is involved in allocating or appropriating funds for cducation, 
defense, agriculture, space, o r  cbher pmgrams. Even after funds have bccn ap- 
propriated, say, to NASA, decisions have to be made 3s to which programs with- 
in NASA are to be undertaken and which are not to be undertaken. (The actual 
budget process essentially revel ses the order indicated here. Nevertheless, 
the principle is not altered.) How are public programs, then, to bc awarded or 
denied funding? In essence, ppJjects that contribute more to a society's well- 
being and welfare should receiw funding. For example, if  two undertakings cost 
the same, but the first resulted rn more benefits to society than the second, it is 
reasonable that the first  would be funded - given that available funds are cnough 
for one of the two only. Cost-benefit analysis, alias cost effectivcness, seeks 
to provide sbch cornpatisons. 
Historically, the 1936 Flood Control Act probably represents the earlicst 
documeiited example of benefit-cost philosophy applied to federal programs; it, 
in essence, permitted the Federal Sovernment to undertake water projects for 
flood control purposes . . . if the benefits to whomsoever they may accruc' are 
in excess of the estimated costs . . , . 
Starting in 1964, DOD required that alternative weapon systems bc evaluated 
based on cost, schedule, and effectiveness. In 1965, Presidcnt Johnson asked a11 
Government agencies to adopt a similar system. Later in 1965, the Burcau of 
the Budget issued Bulletin No. 66-3 which stipulated that benefit-cost analysis 
was to be L;ed in selecting programs to meet the goals of the various Govern- 
ment ageicies. 
Economics is subdivided into micro- and macroeconomics. Micrueconomics 
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This report introduces the technical reader to the area of cost-kncbfit 
analysis (CBA), a branch of ecxmomics. The report has two objectives: (1) l’o 
provide a technical person an adequate background to conduct a reasonable CBA 
study, and (2) To give a decision maker the ability to understand and evaluate the 
results of such a study. 
A technical person not trained in economics should plan to engage in solne 
readings in economics before carrying out a CBA study. A suggested reading 
list is included. This report does not presume any background in cwwnoniics, 
but such a background would provide a worker with sensitivity to the ccmccpts in- 
volved. 
The present work would not be adequate for analysis of iindertakings requir- 
ing investments of the order of tens of millions of dollars or more. Trained 
economists should work on such efforts. 
OVERVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT APiALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis measures or ranks the desirabilit! of projects wht*rc> 
the long-term view is essential. (The same priiiciples applj to a o11e- or h’o- 
year horizon, but such a time span usually has fewer unknowns, fewer assulnp- 
tions, and less uncertainty.) The end result is a comparison of the  cconomic 
differences between and among available alternatives. In othcr words, the 
analysis seeks to establish the relative merits of the various altcrnativcs V C ~ ~ S I I S  
each other rather than the total o r  absolute merit of one or all options. 
The analyst seeks to define the problem, catalog all direct and intlircct costs 
and benefits, and state clearly all assumptions made in t h e  process. Rcst ,  a l l  
quantifiable direct benefits and costs are expressed in some coniniot~ units; hope- 
fully, dollars. At this point, the costs and benefits arc discounted to thv prc,sc*nt 
in order to compare on the same time basis. (Present value is discussed 111 a 
later section.) Two comparisons are now possible: 
Present value of benefits 
Present value of costs 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) - 
Net Present Value (NPV)  =- Present value of benefits 
- Present value of costs 
A third comparison, the internal rate of return (IROR) can also be conipdcd, 
by tr ial  and error such that NPV = 0, and is discussed later. 
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The remaining work represents the major portion of the study. It consists 
of documentation of the problem, the data, analysis of resu l t s ,  and a full discus- 
sion of indirect costs/benefits and intangibles. It is important to note that intan- 
gibles are not necessarily indirect effects, rather they are effects that cannot be 
class of effects, incommensurables, consists of outcomes that are quantifiable 
but not in dollar equivalents, such as the number of lives saved. k i n e  manage- 
ment scientists argue that the greatest value of a study lies in the identification 
of any significant intangibles and/or incomi..cnsurables. This is so because 
these effects do not appear in the nunierical data and analysis - which are often 
confused for  a llsolutionll tu the problem. 
. quantified. Examples would be satisfaction, security, and prestige. Another 
SPILWVERS (EXTE AINALITIES) 
An activity or  undertaking results in effects o r  outcomes; some a re  dircct 
while others are indirect. Thus, production generates a product - which is the 
objective. The undertaking also leads to hiring a work force, contributing to 
po Hut ion, providing tax revenues, inc rcasingidec reasing property val ilc's, con - 
sumption of natural re sources, altered transportation practices, increased/ 
decreased profits plus a host  of other effects of vaqing magnitude. Those ef- 
lects which follow production, but were not intcnded, a rc  rcferrcd to :ts spill- 
uvers, neighborhood effects, side effects, external economies :mi  extcarnrtl dis- 
econoiiiies, or simplj  externalities. 
Whilc no tabulation of spillover effects is coiiiplcte, at1 offort must be ni:itlc 
to account fo r  and discuss the iiiorc important o n c ~ s .  Thcre is, hvwevcr, thc 
danger of double counting which an analyst must avoid. For example, consider 
a product worth $1OU that led to employing $30 of labor. Of course, labor wages 
represent a benefit, but to report that the said product resulted in  $130 of bcne- 
fits double cowits wages which already appear in the value o r  price o f  thti product 
The sarnc would be said for profits, shareholders revenues, o r  incomc taxcis. In 
other words, CBA i s  not altered whether a benefit :~ccruc:s to individual x, indi- 
vidual y ,  company z, local or national C;ovc~i*nmcnts. Economic analysis in the 
present context concentrates 0 1 1  betiefits/disbenefits to whomsocvcr they may 
accrue in society. This does not preclude niirntiori of the desirability of ,  say, 
locating a facility in a chronically underemployed region as  long ;IS no doublc 
cctuntiiig is involved. 
'I'hc coni par i son  inc lude s some spillove r s , refe rrecl tu :is tr*chnolog ic:il spill- 
overs.  There a r c  two classes of spillovcrs o r  extcrnalities, tc*chnolugical : I d  
Cost-benefit :inalysis compares bcncfits to costs for a I;ivcw iiivclstincwt 
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pecuniary. Considering that only one of the two classes is to be included in the 
numerical comparison, it is imperative that the subtle distincticin be understood. 
(While pecuniary externalities are not formally included in the cost-benefits coni- 
parison, the discussion should bring out any significant pecuniary spillovers. ) 
Pecuniary spillovers encompass those financial and related effects of an in- 
vestment that would reasonably follow from an equivalent expenditure. Thus, a 
small country may suddenly find its treasury overflowing with revenues from a 
new plant. All the increased services provided the country's residents through 
the new tax revenues are pecuniary spillovers. Pecuniary spillovers are - not in- 
eluded in CBA studies. 
Technological spillovers relate to resource utilization and availability. 
Thus a power plant may add to a nearby river all the thermal "enrichment" pcr- 
missible under the law. A downstream plant then might not be able to dispose v f  
its waste heat into the river; this plant has to invest in other expensive equipment 
to handle its waste heat. This additional expense incurred by the downstream fa- 
cility is a technological externality that should lx included as a disbenefit in eval- 
uating the BCR of the power plant upstream. 
Another example of technological spillovers would be the effect of the new 
plant on labor supply. The increased demand for labor in the geographic region 
of the facility may lead to higher wages demanded and received by the labor force. 
Now, other eniployers are having to pay higher wages. This incremental incrcisc 
in  wages paid by other employers must be counted a s  a technological spillover and 
entered as a disbenefit. (This incremental increase in wages because of demand 
for  labor by the new plant is not priced in the  facilitj  accounting; someone c.lse 
pays for it!) 
The two typcs of spillovers a re  riot always easy to tell apart and frcqucntly 
overlap. The important point is to identify the major technological spillovers 
which a re  usually the cost drivers among the spillovers. 
LIMITATIONS O F  COST-BEhEFIT ANALYSIS 
The application of economics suffers froni the kind of weaknesses character- 
istic of all sucial sciences. A cost-benefit study incorporates in it four dimcn- 
sions of limitations; these a re  not equally serious nor entirely insurrnountablc. 
However, none of them may be eliminated. 
(1) Intangibles and quantifiablcs. Certain variables, like costs, arc' gcncr- 
ated in dollars; even those, however, are estimates of future prices. In thc 
area of quantifiable benefits, on the other hand, more uncertainty is involved in 
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converting all forms of benefits to a common measure such as dollars. Hut 
many factors are intangible and thus defy expression as dollars. 
mates of fu tu re  costs and benefits w a s  mentioned. Another dinicnsion of this 
seen at the present an.i hence do not appear (as assets or  liabilities) in the 
analysis. Also critical in any cost-benefit rintllysis is  tht. choice of a discount- 
ing factor - which is at best a guess. 
carry a connotation of "bad. 'I) This kind of subjectivity or bias creeps into 3 
study in two ways:  
tive, or one part of an alternative such as cwsts. 
before completing the study. 
a study is comparing alternatives fostered by diiferent teams, there is a tcn- 
detrcy, if subconsciously, to favor "our" proposal. 
How could these limitations be overcome? They could not be entirely eradi- 
cated; they could, rather, be minimized. The best approach for that apK .irs to 
bc in making these limitations clear and known to both the analyst as well ;is thc 
manager. 
(2) Future and uncertaintx. In the preceding paragraph, uncertainty in esti- 
* phenonienon deals with factors, outcomes, and effects that are ertirely unfore- 
(3) Analyst bias. (This is innocent, uncontrollahlc bias which docs not 
(a) An analyst i s  usualiy more vclrsed o r  acquainted with onc alterna- 
(b) Sometinies a worker has taken a position vis-a-vis one alternativt. 
(4) Organizational bias. Organizational competition is not unusual. When 
1' HE CA UT 10 N S  i 
Cost-bencfit analysis is a management dc%cision making tool. 
nicnt itself, this tool remains a blend of ar t  and science. Why inot, thcw, Icit\.c* 
it to a nianagcr to apply his art aid  science to a given situation? It must be 
emphasized that a cost-bennfit study does not in any way rcducci a decision 
maker's options, it only brings into focus relative economic adviU1tagc.s of vari- 
ous available alternatives. 
A person traincd i n  cnginccring o r  science frcyuc.ntly has difficultics in :I!)- 
prcciating the value and limitations of economic analysis which, of nc.c.c.ssity is 
not exact. Economics deals with an area of study that i s  behavioral in naturci 
and heiicc is not quantifiable o r  measurable in thc same sense as cnginccbruig, 
L i l i c l  iniaiiag:c.- 
. chemistry. or physics. 
Cost-bcncfit analysis, pcr se, deals with future wCints, and hunnrui ability 
to predict futurc outconics is very limited. W e  usually have to dcal with vs- 
trapolations, cstimntes, and c'vc'n gucsses. This means that two mialysts 
_i LI 1Yg r / .JL 
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separated by distance and time would be expected to have different findings when 
studying the same phenomenon. Subjectivity and experience of the analyst, for 
one thing, affect the outcome of such a study. Even if the sme investigator 
w e r e  to undertake the same cost benefit study twice, two o r  five years apart, he 
would likely arrive at different r e su l t s  and conclusions because the passage oi 
time reduces uncertainties and reveals previously unforeseen, yet relevant, 
parameters or factors. All  the uncertainty and other weaknesses that afflict 
economic analysis, however, do not deem it incorrect or useless. If exact 
answers were  called ior, one would need to overwme two problems: (1) predict- 
ing the fu ture  which introduces uncertainties and inaccuracies; and (2) eliminating 
uncontrolled factors which entails maintaining society in a laborato: 3' environment. 
Neither of these two dimensims of management decisions can be eliminated. 
CBA, conceptually, measures costs and benefits to society from a given 
undwtaking. This, however, is easier said than done; a worker is generally 
more familiar with: one agency, one field of technology, m e  sector of the econ- 
omy, one region of thc country, one type of outcome (namAy, benefits), and the  
present and near-term effects. 
What this adds up to is that it is difficult and time consuming to carry out a 
complete assay or measurement of costs and benefits relevant to a study. Thcre- 
fore, w e  usually accept some compromise, o r  trade off, between completeness 
and timeliness/costliness. 
This is not to encourage incompleteness or oversight. To the contrary, it 
is to sharpen an analyst's awareness of this problem calling for extra attention 
to and study of these areas  where one's preparation is lacking and insufficient. 
PRESEKT VALUE I 
This is the familiar "time value ol' money" concept, that a dollar rcaceivcd 
today is worth more than a dollar received one o r  two years later 
"A future dollar" may be discounted back to the present a s  follows: 
where 
I P V  discounted present value, $, of a future transaction 
I 
I i interest o r  discounting rate 
N number of years  before transaction takes place 
I 
1 . 1  -1 I 1 %  1 c - 111 1 ' 1  
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Thus, if the rate of discount is 10 percent, $100 today and $121 two ycars  
latcr are equivalent - in economics jargon %we arc indifferent" to the two trans- 
actions. 
An annuity is a related concept. It represents a payment recurring at equal 
intervals in the future, like mortgage or car payments. The present value of an 
annuity is expressed as: 
K 
P V A =  , A 
7 
h=-i (1 + gN 
where 
PVA 
K 
N 
A 
i 
value of annuity expressed in today's dollars 
number of periods, years  
1, 2, . . ., K 
recurring value of annuity 
discounting rate 
Thus, to finance a $4300 auto loan at 15 percent for 36 months, the monthly 
payment, o r  annuity, would be $150. Mathematically, 
36 
\ I 
'\. 
A source of confusion should be pointed out. The above auto loan cost $4300 
to an economist. hut cost $5400 o r  $150 x 36 to an accountant. I n  accounting, 
and budgeting terms, a dollar spent today and a dollar spent two years later a re  
both entered as $1 each; in other words, the time value of money is not recog- 
nized from a bookkeeping standpoint - thus the term, accounting dollar. An :IC- 
counting dollar is one that is spent o r  received any time. Whereas 1976 dollars 
a re  those spent/received during 1976 o r  those discounted back to 1976 by the PV 
formula. 
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INTERPRETATION OF DISCOUNTING OR INTEREST RATE 
The conclusions of an analysis would vary depending on the rate of discount 
used. Thus analysis may indicate one dternalive to be superior to another, but 
that finding could be reversed at a different rate of discount. What, then, is the 
correct rate of discount'! There is no such a quantity! 
The discounting rate used for  a public undertakiag represents a balance be- 
tween two rates. A social rate of time preference and a social rate of return 011 
investments. (No  rigorous definitions will be attempted here considering the 
economic background required, but a general view is given. ) A rate of time 
preference reflects a society's valuation of future benefits. For  example, how 
much do we presently value the availability of petroleum to future generations'.' 
A rate of return on investments relates to the return expected from a public in- 
vestment of the same amount. The two rates are not equal and hence a compro- 
mise is not straightforward. 
In order  to minimize confusion about what rate of discount to u s e  and to 
standardize discounting in all CBA's undertaken by Federal agencies, 0MB has 
issued Circular No. A-94 Revised (March 27, 1972). The circular stipulates 
that essentially all Federal agencies shall use a discounting rate of 10 percent. 
This should be checked periodically since OMB may change the rate a s  time 
passes. 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Cost-effectiveness (CE) is an economic technique similar to CBA except 
in the type of problems where it is applied. In CBA, quantification in dollars 
of as many costs and benefits as possible is sought. But some problems do not 
lend themselves to such analysis. Chief among this c lass  of problems is the de- 
fense area; expressing benefits of a defense system in dollars is not useful or 
possible. Instead, a new system is evaluated in t e rms  of its cffectivcwess and 
its contribution to the overall preparedness of the defense effort. (Preparedness 
is evaluated by simulation and game theory techniques - which are beyond the 
realm of this discussion. ) 
Effectiveness is a measure of how well a system performs its function in  
various operational conditions. Here, again, interesting problems arise.  A 
system may perform a very good job in one aspect of its mission, but in another 
circumstance may be ineffective o r  less  effective. The problem, clearly, is in 
cxgressii., these two divergent performances in one measure of effectiveness! 
Fortunately this does not have to be treated here and is mentioned only f u r  
competeness. 
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INTERNAL €UTE OF RETURN 
A reasonable number of public expenditures receive cost-benefit treatment. 
The internal rate of return (IROR) is also used to compare projects. There is no 
reason that this criterion could not be an integral part of every economic study; 
all the data are ready for  the IIDR analysis. 
Cost-benefit analysis reveals the ratio of benefits to costs at a given interest 
rate. IROR represents the interest or discounting rate at which costs equal bene- 
fits (NPV = 0). 
K r-.' CBN - cN) 
N P V  = = O  
L!---J N=O (1 + IHQR)N 
where 
B benefits, $ 
c costs, $ 
N 1, 2, . . ., K 
Table I shows the steps involved in arriving at IROR by a trial and error solution. 
As one gains more experience, the number of iterations required is reduced. The 
method calls for increasing/decreasing the discounting rate systematically until 
the NPV approaches zero. 
Table I1 depicts two alternatives where the BCR criterion fails to show any 
difference. (A BCR of 1.8 vs. 1.9 for these cases is basically the same ratio 
when future uncertainties are kept in mind.) However, the IROR criterion show 
investment A to be clearly superior. 
Table III reflects another example where investment X is superior eve;. 
though the competitor has a slightly higher BCR at 10 percent. 
A situation showing two equivalent alternatives is seen in table IV. In this 
case each criterion, BCR and IROR, shows one of the two possibilities to be 
clearly better than the other. 
It should be borne in mind that BCR is sensitive to the assumed rate of dis- 
count. For that reason we like to use both the BCR as well as the IROR criteria 
in order to tell whether two or more alternatives are clearly different from each 
other economically. 
WHAT ARE COMPARABLE INVESTMENTS? 
Economic analysis techniques covered in this work (CBA, NPV, IROR, CE) 
generally yield answers of comparable quality. Technicians should understand 
0 
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all these techniques as each method sheds light on a problem from a different 
perspective. More reliable analyses would utilize CBA, NPV, and IROR in com- 
paring different or alternative undertakings. The BCR provides a comparison of 
the ratio of benefits to costs fo r  each venture. The NPV yields estimates of ex- 
cess benefits generated over costs. (Both CBA and NPV methods assume some 
given discount rate.) IROR of an undertaking reveals its intrinsic rate of benefit 
generation. 
Even while all three tools are used together, there are limitations to the ap- 
plication of economic analysis to expenditures. The ideal would be to provide a 
decision maker (who has x dollars to spend) with a list of possible expenditures, 
ordered by decreasing economic value. From this list the decision maker selects 
the first N projects whose total cost comes to x dollars. In this manner, funds 
are allocated optimally to the must productive areas. CBA is not capable of pro- 
viding such rankings. For example, BdR's of social- and defense-oriented pro- 
grams cannot be compared meaningfully. Not even within the same agency, such 
aE h a ,  could one compare all programs based on their  BCR's or IROR's. 
This is not to suggest that the availability of BCR's/IROR's would be of no value. 
(Other techniques allow comparison of agency-wide or  nation-wide programs. ) 
Projects can be classified as related and unrelated. Unrelated programs, 
such as defense and social programs, do not lend themselves to CBA treatment 
as stated ear l ier .  Related programs consist of three types: 
research than development. This would not be subject to CBA unless alternative 
approaches are possible - which is frequently the case.  If no alternativef a re  
clear, this type of work may be compared to the present or "no action'' decision 
and CBA would then be applied. 
(2) Supporting, parallel, and series programs. Here is an area where eco- 
nomic comparisons are  made frequently and improperly, as seen below: 
(1) Exploration of new areas .  Exploratory work is more in the realm of 
t 
BCR Expenditure 2 -
!I 1M 1 . 2  
B 100M 1 . 5  
C 2 B 1 .5  
In the example shown above, it is improper to concludc that C is a better in- 
vestment than A - considering the level of each investment. Additionally, A 
may represent work to improve solar cell efficicncy, B ma j  represcnl im- 
proved efficiency and lower costs of a :<tal  power system for a given mission. 
Clearly A is a subset of B. Therefo;. , any comparison of A and B should 
indicate that A is included iri B - if thhb is indeed the case. C may bc a new 
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computer system for  a mission. Therefore, it is improper to sav that B and 
of experlditure required by each and consider, too, t3rat the two projects are not 
comparable as discussed in the next section). 
criminating power. Alternate approaches that have the same target or end result 
are suited to comparative analysis for  the following reasons: 
(a) They usually have different price tags or costs. 
(b) Their outcomes are reasonably similar. 
(c) Spillovers, good as well as bad, to the economy and society are 
I C are e q u w  c0sbeffeCtiVe since the BCRs are the came (consider the level 
a 
(3) Alternatives or options. This is the area where CBA has its most dis- 
very similar; these spillovers do not, therefore, need to be quantified except 
when they differ from one to another opt' in. 
In this manner it is possible to reduce estimation and forecasting errors by con- 
centrating only on the areas of dissimilarity amo?g alternatives. Hence, this 
represents a category where CBA studies would be most effective without calling 
on trained economists to perform such studies. 
PRICES 
Cost-benefit analysis deals with projections into the future. Tne decision 
maker attempts to balance h e r h i s  view between the present and the futiire, but 
the future has more uncertainty than the present - especially when it comes to 
economics. Therefore, a relevant queb3ion arises as to what prices should be 
used for costs and/or benefits taking place in the future. 
Assuming the factor is priced at the time of a study, its current price is used 
as a base. This base price is augmented or adjusted in order to reflect: 
manufacturing methods, marketing approaches, which would affect. the price/ 
performance of the factor should be included. 
(2) New markets. If a factor is e.upected to penetrate into uses not occupied 
currently, then this increased demand/supply W.11 have an effect on price levels 
and should be considered. 
(3) Learning curves. Industrial engineers have made good progress in esti- 
mating reasonable impacts of lewning experience on prices and costs. Such 
factors a re  included i n  projections. 
(4) Expected factor pricss.  Frequently, price changes are known in advance 
due to contractual obligations. For example, a labor contra& may call for a 
10 percent wage increase over a three-year period; such a price effect may be 
considered in projections. 
No simple answer is available; however, some guidelines a re  provided. 
(1) Expected technology. Any foreseen changes due to resource availability, 
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(5) General price level (inflation). The first thought that cames to mind 
when projecting prices to the future is accounting for inflationary cfiects. This 
intuition is misleading. While this treatment cannot fully address and explain 
inllation, two points should be brought out: (a) economists have not been able to 
explain inflation o r  why it occurs successfully to t5is date, and {b) including 
anticipated inflation in projections would lead tl 2ffcctively doubling actual infla- 
tion rates. Hence it is iiiportant to resist the temptation to include this factor 
in the projection of future prices. 
today's price. Unfortunately, no formula is available which incorpcrates the 
above factors and determines a price level of an input factor in the future. A 
combination of judgment, intuition, aad experience are called for, and then the 
answer AS only an estimate. 
costs are  always underestimated. It is wise to resist such ;i tendency - unless 
benefits a re  also beefed up considering that benefits a r e  alsci underestimated - 
but receive less  scrutiny! 
v 
The remaining question would be that of arriving at d fu turc  price given 
There is frequently a tendency to "beef up" estimated prices because project 
OPPOHTUNIl Y COST 
This is a kcy economic conccpt that has not been brought into the CBA di+ 
cussion. Its omissiwi cmst+ tcs one reason the  applicability of CBA has bee? 
restricted within this report Ir the most gcncral applications of CBA, oppor- 
tunity cost auld not be overlooked; one or  more economists would be involved 
in such a study. As  suggcstcd elsewhc re, CEA as outlined here may be an: licd 
usefully to alternative problems. 
invest in the alternative undcr consideration. Considcr for example LI family 
trying to decide whcther o r  not to buy a new car. In light of thcir financial s i tw- 
Opportunity cost may be thought of a s  what we miss or  do without when wc 
tion, they a rc  aware that should they proceed to buy ;I new car, it would 1nc':ui :I ' 1  q -* 
three-year pmtponenicnt in the expansion of thcir cxisting housc, Ilcnce, thc 
opportunity cost of buying a new car  for this family is the postponed satisfaction 
from an eapanded house. 
Within a Government budget, a pwposcd tlcfcnw prbgrani ma? lead to R 
dclay in 
tcm is, thereforc, the foregone so4al  value dcrivcd fiwin ch.. pc;.itpond o r  
abandoned program 
Trying to brit. + 2 conccpt of opportunity cost into CUA is, ' ~ ) w v c r ,  11~11c.h 
more complex thar pears from thcsc cxamplcs. licfinrd cconoi. ic tools would 
educational program. The opprtunity rust of the givcn dc.fcwsc. SJ s- 
CASE: mUDY - EONOMICS OF 90JAR CELL DEVEWPMENT 
TMs case demonatrrterr tbe apptication of c.coaomic tuu.ty~Is (cost- 
bmfit meahxblogy) to pmp~sed space e~~etldltums. The work comprises nn 
evdurtion of the economic merits of proposed R&T efforts in the %ma of space 
silicon solar cells over tbe years 1977 b 1W2. 
Cost-bmefit anaiysls provides an assuesrnent of the economic woithincss of 
an tu&-. This metboQloay co. ipama benerflts to costs on the same time 
basis. All cash ihws an. disoowted at the rate of 10 percent as outlintxi in 
OMB guidr?lincs. The .~alysis Qes not address noneconomic consIdLrtttions 
which are pertiaent in decision making, such as social, polltical, and cw1mn- 
mental factors. 
Problem 
U T  funding has bcwn prupostd for solar cell dcvclopmeirt . This cconoinic 
analysis conctwtraka on propused activities lcadlng to rtxiuced wc-ight, iniptuvwl 
efficier.cks, und lower costs of span! silicon solar cclls. Thc ilppropritrtioii 01 
I d s  is to be wntainwl in thc 1977 to 1982 budgets; L1w.w c*,qwirditurcs :in- sum- 
niaritnd In table V. 
The proyotrt-d inipt.oucmcwts in cwll technology arc' highlighted in t S l c  VI. 
The prt-wnt cfficicnc-y of 13.5 p t r c n t  repwstwts thc currtwt syncr. qual i t id  
ccll, whereas thc dcvclepmcnt effort is gcanvi to yroducc D cell that is 50 per- 
cent lighter turd much c h e a p r  - without sacrifichg ccll efficicncy . Justification 
of the cvqwnditure io =*en in the rcductd weight mid cod of such r.c*l ls .  
It IS not r*lr.ar ut this p i n t  whether some nrissioiis would be wvkght- 
cwnstmincxi. (tfuwcver, in the CBIF;. of thc Satellite IWwc'r Systciii (SPS) ptvtotgpc, 
it is likcly that sottic' irunibcr of hunches niay be sav.4 at an cstinintcd cost . I  
$Zu millmn per launch. 1 Additionally, the ovtvall weight saving 11) the  solar nr- 
ray is not clwr; thercforv, no credit is claimed in this Mu* tor wcight snvirigs 
T h i s  rc-irdcrs the l u d y s l s  to be cunsc'rvativtb . The only snviiigs iiwluttcd ctiwctly 
rn thc iiimlysi:. arc' thw rcaulting from lower cvwt. 
to $5/W by l!Ml-J'i)HP. Thin mpruscnt8 tho only dircd bciwfit of thc pro~n)scd 
Ourwnt cost of spacc solar oclls is a b u t  $luOlw wi th  a tnrgct ndwtion 
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R&T efforZ a8 computed in this study. This, in a sense, is conserv&ive consid- 
ering that weight savings are also likely. On the other hand, the achievable cost 
reduction is speculative considering the time element. 
The analysis presented here is based on two main scenarios of potential or 
possible levels of space programs and activities extending from the mid-80's to 
the end of the century. These scenarios do not represent a set of defined mis- 
sions that are on '%he drawing boards, t' rather they consist of a projection of 
two levels of activity, one being aggressive and active (may be viewed as opti- 
mistic), the second being reasonablc and realistic. The missions s b w n  in 
table VII are oniy educated guesses or candidates. Understandably, experts 
would not agree on reasonable estimates of space activity 8 to 23 years  in the 
future in the absence of a national space program. However, that docs not de- 
tract from the usefulness of sucb analysis from the decision maker's standpoint - 
he is offered a better means of assessing the fu ture .  
Estimation of program benefits is simple once cost reductions and activity 
scenarios are established. (Luckily in NASA work, direct spillovers are mini- 
mal which simplifies the analystts task.) The benefits shown in table MI repre- 
sent the product of projected cost savings ($95/W) times "estimatedfv Government 
purchases of space solar cells. 
Results and Discussion 
Once the scenarios of space activity are set up, the computational aspect is 
mechanical and algorithmic. Difficulties may arise in accepting the scenarios, 
but not the cost-benefit or economic conclusions which should be viewed by the 
decision maker in context with other relevant, noneconomic impacts and factors. 
? ' k b  results of the cost-benefit analysis a r c  presented in table VTII. Compu- 
tations were pcrforined using the computer program presented in the appendix. 
For each scenario the impact of benefit underachievement and cost overruns at 
the 25 percent level were also included to provide additional insight into the 
analysis sensitivitv . 
The active space program scenario is seen to be economically meritorious; 
BCR = 12.4, IROR = 37 percent. Even when program coats and benefits are re- 
vised to allow for 25 percent e r r o r s  the scenario is quite attractive; BCR = 7.5 
and IIPOR = 30 percent. 
A "realistic" program scenario is considerably weaker than the active pro- 
gram picture ju s t  discussed; BCR = 2.5 and IIWR 18 percent. This is fu r the r  
1s 
weakened when the possibility of 0verr)ms and underachievement are considered. 
Three variations of this scenario were evplurled. 
(1) Consideriag that mission requirements are probably purchased about two 
years b o r e  the mission date, the realistic scenario is improved slightly. 
(2) When one allowed for  a lump sum benefit accrual beyond 2000, aggregated 
at 2010, additional improvement in the economic results is seen. Considering 
the potential new technologies beyond 1982, however, the meaningfulness of such 
a benefit past 2000 is not very clear. 
(3) Combining both possibilities of items 1 and 2 above, further improvement 
in the economics is observed. The justification of + i s  estimation of benefits 
though is not very strong. 
R&T expenditures in this area of space silicon cells would have considerable 
qi l lovers  or indirect benefits in the &ma of terrestrial solar cells. The Depart- 
ment of Energy is seeking to reduce the cost of terrestrial cells from the current 
$15 to $20/W to $0.50 by 1986 and to $0.10 to $0.30 by 2000. IC order to bring 
about a reduction of two orders  of magnitude, major developments in the technol- 
ogy and manufacturing methods would be necessary. When one considers that by 
1985 a demand of 500 MW/year for terrestrial cells is forecast, one realizes the 
magnitude of potential savings that could materialize due to transfer of technology 
from this space effod. These spillovers were  not included in the numerical eval- 
uation of benefits resulting from this program; however, judging by past experi- 
ence of technology transfer from space programs there is little doubt that major 
benefits would accrue in the present case where the two areas are  so closely 
related. 
Case Study Conclusion 
Economic analysis of proposed R&T effort in the area of space solar cells 
This report summarizes to the decision maker the economic aspects of the 
was undertaken. The results are presented and interpreted. 
expenditure. However, the decision of approving/disapproving an undertaking 
could not be relegated to economics - which is only a tool. Managerial and policy 
decision making encompass assessment of political, social, institutional, and 
other impacts in addition to economic factors. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Economic analysis provides tools to enhance management decision making. 
Cost-benefit analysis seeks to summarize and evaluate the economic aspects of 
decision making. 
psseslegal, 8oc 
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it must be remembered, however, that decision making encom- 
ml, economic, politid, and environme-1 impacts. - all of 
which must be assessed; in other words, economics is but one dimension to be 
assessedby a decision maker. 
This report, although limited in scope, can provide the practicing engineer 
with adequate background to undertake an economic comparison of alternative 
projects. Thus, analysis would bc Sldertaken at a point where an objectite may 
be achieved by approach X or approach Y. it allows a technical person to make 
the economic comparison between alternatives X and Y. 
Managers realize that virtually all significant aspects of taday*s events are 
related to decisions made months, even years, ago. Decisiom made today dic- 
tate courses of action in the future. Therefore, CBA attempts to take the fore- 
seeable future into account quantitatively in today's decisions. (Sometimes one 
gets the impression that cost-benefit analysis is a marketing tool within an organ- 
ization; as though it is a means of justifying expenditures. The drunk and light 
pole analogy is in order; in this case, the decision maker uses economic analysis 
fo r  support rather than enlightenment. Needless to say this is not the ?ppropriate 
role of CBA in decision making and planning.) 
A cost-benefit study progresses through stages as outlined below: 
1. Gaining familiarity with CBA, welfare economics, and economics in 
2. Learning about the project, its nature, objective, and history. 
3. Writing, and reaching agreement on, project objectives, inputs/outputs, 
4. Enumerating alternatives along with the asbxiated costs and benefits of 
5. Converting, whenever possible, all costs and benefits to dollar equivalents 
6 .  Determining (from OMB) the appropriate rate of discount and carrying out 
7 .  Documenting the work through: a discussion of CBA, problem analysis, 
general. 
as well a s  its time horizon. 
each. 
o r  analogs. 
the necessary computations. 
discussion of prices used, presentation of CRA results, discussion of results 
emphasizing intangible effects and any special factors. 
a review of the associated economic factors. This work outlines how cost-benefit 
analysis satisfies such a role in some Government expenditures. 
In conclusion, it is evident that no pruject assessment is complete without 
17 
The computer pro~ram that folluws carries out the numerical manipula- 
tions and calculations associated with cost-benefit analysis. 
Input drtp necessoFy is as follows: 
Datacardno. 1: Columns 11 to 60: Any title. * 
Data card no. 2: Columns 1 to 10: Interns& or discount rate 
entered as a percent and including a 
Columns 11 to 20: Percent of benefits 
acheved - fo r  sensitivity analysis and 
including a clecimal point. Wben left 
blank, 75 percent is assumed in the 
Pro%=. 
decimal point. 
COlUmnS 21 to 30: Percenl Of costs in- 
curred or cost oyerrun - for sensitivity 
analysis and including a decimal point. 
When left blank, 128 percent is assumed. 
Da+ Card(S)  no. 3: Columns 1 to 4: Calendar year (the f i r s t  
year to appear represents first year 
when some expenditures arise or when 
a decision has to be made). 
Columns 5 to 16: Costs during said year. 
Columns 17 to 28: Benefits during said 
year (repeat ae many data cards no. 3 
as there are years  during which a cost 
and/or a benefit occur). 
Last card: Blank card must follow case. When 
analysis consists of one case only, a 
blank card must follow. 
- -
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TABLE I.  - CALCULATION OF I W R  
phere is little justification in refining the IROR solution to any 
decimal places given the uncertainties involved in the cost, 
benefit, and dates data. ] 
Year Project transaction 
0 -2 M (cost) 
2 3 M (benefit) 
4 4 M (benefit) 
Trial and error solution for I m R  
4 3 4 = -2 + - +- 
1.210 1.464 
3 +  NPV -2 + 
(1 + 0 .  ( 1  + 0.  114 
= -2 + 5.21 = t 
4 3 4 = -2 + - + - 
1.69 2.856 
3 +  NPV = -2 + 
(1 + 0.3)% (1 + 0 . 3 ) ~  
= -2 + 3.18 = +  
3 4 
2.250 5.062 
NPV=-2+-+- 
= - 2 + 2 . 3 2 = +  
3 4 
2.560 6.554 
NPV=-2+-+- 
= -2 + 1.78 = - 
3 4 
2.402 5.772 
NPV--2+-+- 
-2 + 1.94 
3 4 
2.372 5.624 
NPV =. -2 + - +- 
- -2 + 1.98 
3 4 
2.341 5.480 
NPV=-2+-+- 
= -2 + 2.01 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
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TABLE 11. - BENEFIT cosr mrio 
Year Investment A Investment B 
Expenditure 0 
Benefit 1 
Benefit 10 
B/C - 1% 
IROR, % 
-1 
2 
0 
, 
I 1.8 
I 100 
-1 
0 
5 
1.9 
18 
TABLE III. - BENEFlT COST RATIO 
~~ 
Expenditure 
Benefit 
Benefit 
B/C - la 
I m R ,  % 
Year 
0 
1 
8 
Investment X Investment Y 
-1 -1 
2 0 
0 5 
1.8 2.3 
100 22 
TABLE IV. - BENEFIT COST RATIO 
Year Investment I Investment 11 
Expenditure 0 -1 -1 
Benefit 1 2 0 
Benefit 4 0 5 
B/C - 1% 1.8 3.4 
IROR, % 100 50 
24 
TABLE V .  - SELECTED R&T WORK ON SOLAR CELLS (1977 TO 1982) 
[All figures in $K.] 
Task 1 1977 
Thin high efficiency 
Cell characteristics 
Radiation 
Metallization 
Substrates 
Annual total 
-1978 -1 1979 I 1980 I 1981 
325 
220 
50 
50 
70 
- 
555 665 47 5 
500 500 500 
50 45 45 
50 45 45 
70 100 120 - - - 
715 I 1225 I 1355 I 1185 
TABLE V i .  - PlWPOSED SOLAR CELL IMPE#)VEMENT 
Year Efficiency , 
9 
197 7 (13.5) 
1981- 13.5 
1982 
$/tV w m  
100 50 
5 100 
$95 I I Savings i 
1982 
~ 
340 
500 
45 
45 
17 5 
1125 
- 
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TABLE VIIX. - CBA RESULTS FOR SPACE PlU3GRAh.i SCENARIOS 
[Analysis results shown parenthetically represent the combined case of 25% cost 
overrun and 2% benefit underachk ement. 1 
Realistic Realistic Realistic Realistic Active 
+ 2 yr + 2010 + 2010 
+ 2 yr - 
B/C ratio (la) 2.5(1.5) 3 . 0 ( 1 . 8 )  2.9(1.8) 3.5(2.1) 12.4(7.5) 
I m R ,  73 18 (13) 23 (16) 19 (14) 24 (17) 37 (30) 
NPV (I(%,, 7.6 (3.2) 10.3 (5.2) 9.7 (4.7) 12.7 (7.0) 57.4 (40.5) 
1977 $M 
I - I  
wclwff 
Ttut metlmdolqy of cost-bendlt analysis is reviewed and a ca6e stu4v involving sohr cell tech- - i. praatsd. Smphrls b ph-ed on oimplifyiqt the techaique in order to permit a tech- 
deal perrolr d trrird i. ecmmlcs to dr t8ke  a cost-benefit study comparillg alternntive 
apprrwcb b 8 given problem. Tbt role of ceoaomic analysis in -emeat decision m a g  is 
dl.trpsd. In simp- the mcthodobsJ it h been wcarsp~ to restrict the scope a d  pppllc- 
aMUly of tb report. This work w d d  permit conpprisnlrs of Government project alternative6 
mt M m  iab 8com of millloaa of dollars. Mdltlorrpl eonsidentiorr, and corrstnlnbs are out- 
tlned. mnpb are worked out to dcmomtrate the principle8. A computer program which per- 
form tbe conputatiolnl aspects wars in the appendk. 
co6t-benefit .rrPlysis 
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